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the recent literature [Bernanke and Campbell, 1988; Kaufman, 1986; Friedman, 1986; Minsky,
1986; Taggart, 1985; and Kindleberger, 19891. Table 1 provides an overview of the changing
balance sheet of the U.S. nonagricultural corporate business sector from 1960 to 1985. As
these figures indicate market debt has risen in the mid-1980s to a post-1950s high while net
worth is trending down after a 1980 high.
The implications of this rise in debt have varied depending upon the theoretical view
of the proclaimant. Table 2 records some of the undesirable effects that haye already been
witnessed from the increase in debt. These changes, the rise in the number of net
downgradings of corporate bonds, the increase in the number of business failures and the
increase in liabilities at the time of failure, are characteristically associated with
recessions, yet they are transpiring in the midst of the longest expansion since the 1960s.
The fears that are most often expressed about this increased debt usage, are associated
with their impact in a recession. While a recession in this highly leveraged economy is
bound to exacerbate the number of business failures, it is also possible that even without
a recession the sensitivity of business to failure has been affected by the expanded position
that debt holds on the balance sheets of American corporations. In the succeeding sections
it is this latter possibility that is explored. The first section details the literature
on bankruptcy prediction for firms, focusing on the variables that have been most useful in
prediction. The second section presents the variables of two of these models using a  logit
model and current data. In the final section a logit model that includes debt is developed
which shows short term debt to be a major determinant of bankruptcy.
BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION
The literature on bankruptcy prediction is dominated by discriminant analysis models
that proliferated in the 1970s. The major contributions to the applied work in this field
have come from Beaver [1967], Altman [1968, 19831, Altman, Haldeman and Narayanaqn [1977],2
--__-_----- --__-_----- =========------------------ ============---------=================
TABLE 1
Balance Sheet of U.S. Nonfarm corporate Business Sector 1960-85
__------------- _____________--=============----------=====================================
1960 1965 1970 1975
9 Q % % 9 0
1980
s- 0




Tangible 96.1 84.3 90.7 98.4 104.9 99.1
Financial 35.4 35.4 35.9 33.2 34.9 33.4
Liquid 10.0 8.6 6.7 7.5 6.9 \ 8.0
Other 25.4 26.7 29.1 25.8 28.0 ’ '25.4
Total
Liabilities 46.6 47.6 52.5 45.9 48.5 53.3
Market debt 30.1 30.3 34.4 32.7 32.1 36.8
Trade debt 12.5 13.4 15.7 10.8 12.6 12.0
Other 4.0 4.0 2.4 2.5 3.8 4.5
Net Worth 85.0 72.1 74.0 85.7 91.4 79.2
Notes: Data are yearend values, scaled by corresponding fourth-quarter gross national
product (seasonally adjusted at annual rates). Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
Data for trade debt reflect a series break in 1974.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; this is Table 5 in Friedman [1986].3
TABLE 2
SOME EFFECTS OF INCREASED DEBT USAGE
======~=====~===~=___-------~~~~~-~-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Debt Defaults in Post World War II Recessions
Number of Liabilities in
Business Failuresa Business Failures
(per 10,000 concerns) (percent of GNP)
Recessions during 1958-80
1954 42 0.12 \











Net Changes in Credit Ratings of Nonfinancial Corporate Bondsbl
First Half 1986 -97







a. Business failures comprise concerns involved in court proceedings or
voluntary actions involving loss to creditors. Liabilities in business failures
exclude long-term, publicly-held securities. Data for number of business
failures and liabilities in business failures are adjusted for series breaks
after 1983. Sources: American Bankers Association, Dun 6 Bradstreet, U.S.
Department of Commerce (Taken from Table 6 Friedman [1986]) ,
b. Taken from Table 2, Friedman[l986]
1. Source: Standard and Poor's4
Deakin [1972,  19771, Libby [1975], and Edmister [1972]. Beaver (19671 initiated the use of
univariate analysis in failure prediction. The results of his testing showed six balance
sheet ratios to be useful in predicating failure up to five years prior to its actuality.
His "best" predictors were cash flow to total debt, net income to total assets, total debt
to total assets, working capital to total assets, the current ratio and a 'no-credit
Altman [1968]  introduced the use of multivariate discriminant ana
prediction. His Z-score model included five financial ratios that were
lysis in fai lure
found to be the
"best" predictors: working capital to total assets; retained earnings to total assets;
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; market value of equity to book value of
debt; and sales to total assets. The overlap between Beaver's and Altman's findings is
obvious in the working capital to total assets ratio, but it is also clear that Beaver's net
income to total assets is similar to Altman's retained earnings to total assets. Both fall
into the category of profitability, so it becomes a debate as to which measure of
profitability is the proper one. The other categorical overlap in their predictors is the
debt-equity ratio. Since Beaver used strictly balance sheet data, his ratio was total debt
to total assets, and both were measured in book values. Altman, however, used the market
valuation of equity to total debt which added another dimension, the "market's" ex post view
of the firm's value, to the comparative debt-equity ratio. In addition to these total debt-
equity measures, Altman found a measure of debt service in his multivariate analysis to be
statistically significant and to have predicative capacity; Beaver found cash flow to debt
and his "no credit interval" to be instrumental in predicting failure. Both Altman and
Beaver drew their samples from the 1946-1965 time period. Given that this was a period in
economic history in which debt usage was abnormally low, a high debt-equity ratio could be
expected to accompany a failed firm.' Debt was used conservatively by most firms, for the
interval'.
finance of choice was internal funds. Another characteristic of this period was the typeJ
of debt used by firms. For the average healthy firm working capital was funded by internal
sources of funds or when necessary short term borrowing that could be rolled over in a
production period was used. Capital expenditures, too, were primarily financed by internal
funds, but when they were insufficient, long term debt was used.' The total debt to assets
ratio in 1945 in the manufacturing sector was 0.20, and it had only risen to 0.26 by 1958
[Meiselman and Shapiro, 19641. In general, there was a very conservative use of debt in this
period.
The next set of studies drew on firms that had failed between 1964 andx1975. The time
periods in which bankrupt firms were selected for each of these studies was far shorter than
the previous ones. Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan [1977] used a 6 year period; Deakin [1972]
and Libby [1975] used a 7 year period; and Deakin (19771 used a 9 year period. Even though
these are shorter time periods, the cyclical activity during this 12 year period was great.
This business cycle activity may
violation is a recurrent problem
not been addressed adequately.
cause the assumption of stationarity to be violated. This
in studies like these that transpire over time, and it has
The first Deakin [1972]  study drew on Beaver's [1967] work. He combined Beaver's
ratios into a linear discriminant function which allowed him to make a multivariate analysis.
Deakin's results are similar to Beaver's in that cash flow to debt is one of the dominant
predictors. Equally important in predicting failure was the net income to total assets
ratio, finally, in the third year before bankruptcy total debt to total assets acted as a
strong predictor. Libby [1975] used the same data" set as Deakin, but used principal
components analysis to aid in the selection of important predictive variables. His results
found net income to total assets, current assets to sales, the current ratio, current assets
to total assets and cash to total assets to be the best combination of predictors. Deakin's
second study [1977] utilized the predictors that Libby found significant and compared their
predictions to those of the auditors'. Finally, the Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (AHN)6
[1977]  study found seven variables to be important predictors: earnings before interest and
taxes to total assets; normalized standard error of estimate around a 10 year profitability
trend; debt service coverage; retained earnings to total assets; the current ratio; market
value of equity to total capitalization; and a logarithmic transformation of total assets,
The major overlap among the predictors identified in these studies is in the various
profitability measures. In ranking their predictors AHN found retained earnings to total
assets, the normalized standard error of estimate and market value to total capitalization
to be the three most important variables. Deakin [1972] found net income -to total assets
to be as important as cash flow to debt for predictive purposes. Libby did not rank his
variables, but of the five variables to emerge as important, net income to total assets was
one of them. Libby's results differed from the other two in that current assets in relation
to other balance sheet variables was the dominant variable. While a priori it would be
expected that some measure of earnings/profits would play a significant role as a failure
predictor, it would also be expected that debt would emerge as an important predictor.
Unlike the earlier studies, the present ones found little evidence that debt was significant.
In the AHN study the debt service coverage ratio ranked six out of the seven variables, and
in Deakin [1972] total debt to total assets was important for discriminating failure only
in the third year prior to bankruptcy. The question that arises from these results is
whether debt does play such a minimal role or whether it was the cyclical volatility of the
time period and the overall growth in debt usage which represented structural change, thus
violating +Che stationarity assumption. a,
In the following section a logit model that utilizes the important variables of both
of the Altman models will be developed and analyzed.3 These models were chosen as those to
be replicated because of their dominant role in the corporate failure literature. The
coefficients of the variables will be generated from a current data base and then they will
be tested for their statistical significance. Given the structural changes in the economy7
that have transpired since 1968 and 1977, it is not expected that these models will be
statistically significant or have strong predictive capabilities.
THE 1968 AND 1977 MODELS
The data set on which the Altman models will be tested was derived from Standard and
Poor's COMPUSTAT. The construction of the data set was through an almost random process.
For the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 all firms that declared bankruptcy or were liquidated for
economic reasons and had complete information for a core of predictive variables were put
into the bankrupt sub-sample.4 Since the information on bankrupt firms is scarce, it was
necessary to include all of the bankrupt firms in the sub-sample. The solvent sub-sample
was randomly chosen from each year on the basis of complete information for the same core
variables as for the bankrupt firms. When in this selection process a bankrupt firm was
chosen, it was discarded as redundant, and when a firm chosen in the 1985 sub-sample was also
chosen in 1986 or 1987, it, too, was discarded. The final sample included 413 firms, 44 of
which were bankrupt and 369 that were solvent. The 3 years, 1985-1987, were chosen for their
currency as well as their economic similarity.
The major problem with this data set is that it excludes data on most of the firms that
go bankrupt. Inclusion in COMPUSTAT is defined as having securities that are traded on an
exchange. This requirement indicates that a firm has been in operation for a while and that
it has obtained a certain level investor confidence as well as a high profile. Since most
of the firms that go bankrupt are small, very young, low profile and single proprietorship,
they are excluded from the data set. Therefore, the findings can only be said to hold for
corporate firms.
Since size has been found to be a very important determinant in failure prediction,
a brief overview of the sample is important.5 The bankrupt firms are on average smaller than
the solvent firms. The average bankrupt firm had total assets worth $166.79 millions versus
the average solvent firm with its total assets of $320.02 millions. The smallest add largest8
bankrupt firmhad total assets worth $0.96 and $2,648.3 millions, respectively. The smallest
solvent firm was worth $0.14 million and the largest had total assets worth $25,198.0
millions. Using a quartile distribution the average bankrupt firm in each quartile starting
with the first was worth $2.39, $10.35, $37.65 and $616.77 millions, respectively. The same
distribution for the solvent firms is $2.44, $12.16, $55.16 and $1,226.44 millions. The non-
bankrupt firms increasingly out-size the bankrupt firms which could affect the results if
size is not accounted for in the model.
The first Altman [1968] model utilized 5 variables, working capital to total assets
.
(WCAT), retained earnings to total assets (REAT), earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets (ADPAT),  debt to shareholder's equity (DTSEQ), and sales to total assets (SALEAT).
Altman's results found a negative relationship between WCAT, REAT, ADPAT and SALEAT and
bankruptcy, and a positive relationship between bankruptcy and DTSEQ. These same signs would
be expected to hold in the logit model. Table 3A gives the results on Altman's variables
using the current data and logit model. Not only are many of the variables insignificant,
but their signs are also wrong. Both WCAT and REAT take the right signs, but ADPAT, DTSEQ
and SALEAT have the wrong signs. Only REAT has the right sign and is significant at CY < -
0.05. While SALEAT is significant at the 0.01 level, it has the incorrect sign. None of
the other variables, except the intercept, are significant at even the 0.10 level. The
overall indicator of significance, the X2, is 16.65 which demonstrates that the model is
significant at a = 0.01.6 Unfortunately, since the model appears to be misspecified, the X2
is useless.
The Altman models were constructed in an attempt to find the best predictors and to
make economic sense. Translated into logit and using current data the 1968 model exhibits
an inadequacy in terms of economic insight and as Table 3a shows its predictive capability
was not maintained over the years. The conceptual structure of failure analysis is
construction of a model that will discriminate between the two categories of failed and still9
TABLE 3
ALTMAN: THE 1968 MODEL
A.
======__=__=========__=______________------_ ==EE-=__==-=__======--==
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
========================_____==__==_===============~=-==============
C -2.5599865 0.2995281 -8.5467316 0.000
WCAT -0.3425700 0.2748379 -1.2464440 0.213
REAT -0.1707311 0.0827548 -2.0630967 0.039
ADPAT 0.5134788 0.4943521 1.0386906 0.299
DTSEQ -0.1026468 0.0646855 -1.5868603 0.113
SALEAT 0.3938967 0.1527229 2.5791605 0.010
------------------------------------------------------------------- \
Log likelihood -131.76880 X2 = 16.652 \
Cases with BANK = 1 44 Correct Prediction: 3/44 = 7%
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successful. This model does not have that capacity; it tends to identify all of the firms
as solvent. Thus, the total sample's correct prediction result of 89% masks the underlying
correct bankruptcy prediction of 7%. Since the bankrupt firms are only 10% of the total
sample, their correct prediction rate plays a very small role in the total sample results.
Another problem with this model if it is to be used for more than prediction is its
multicorrelation. As the data in Table 3B indicate, there is a high degree of correlation
among the various profitability measures and WCAT. While correlation is not considered to
be a problem in prediction models, it is problematic for models that atte,mpt to explain
behavior.
In the 1968 model Altman accounted for size in his matched-pair sample and since our
sample was random, it may be making an impact on the model's performance. In the 1977 model
Altman altered his sampling method so that a more random sample was used and he then used
size as a predictive variable in his model.
Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan [1977], taking into consideration the technical
advances that had been made in discriminant analysis, generated a new corporate failure
model, ZETA CREDIT RISK. While the coefficients of this model are not in the public domain,
AHN tested the model the model against the 1968 model using both current and 1968 data and
it showed itself to have good predictive capabilities. As was stated in the previous
section, this model relies heavily on earnings/profitability criterion, and not debt, to
differentiate between failed and solvent firms.
In analyzing the AHN variables within the logit model and with current data two
variations became necessary. The AHN model uses a normalized standard error of estimate
variable that is based on a 10 year trend. Maintaining a meaningful number of bankrupt firms
in the sample required a reduction to a six year trend. Also, the market value of common
equity to total capitalization variable in AHN was a 5 year average, for the same reason as
previously mentioned this variable is the current year value, not an average.11
The results of the logit model are provided in Table 4A. The t-statistics show only
two variables are significant at a < 0.01, the current ratio (CR) and the expectational -
future earnings variable (MKVLICPT). Retained earnings to total assets (REAT) is significant
at Q = 0.10 level. All three of these variables also have the correct sign. The remaining
are insignificant variables, of which only earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
(ADPAT) has the wrong sign. The others, log of total assets  (L&AT), earnings before interest
and taxes to interest payments (ADPINT) and normalized standard error of estimate (STANDSEE),
have the correct sign. \
.
Overall, the X2 indicates that the model is significant at less than 0.005, but the
predictive capability of the logit model falls far below that of its discriminant analysis
origin. Table 4A shows the correct predictions for the AHN model. In bankruptcy prediction
it scored 15% correct, while in solvency it had a 98% correct prediction rate. The total
correct prediction rate was 89%. While this model is more accurate in bankruptcy prediction
than the 1968 model, it still is not very good. A random draw from this sample would predict
an 11% correct bankruptcy prediction rate.
Another indicator of effectiveness is the probability effects. The coefficients of
these variables are insufficient information to determine the effects of a change in a
variable's value on the probability of bankruptcy
change in the probability due to a change in a
following manner:
Pr(Y = 1) = (logit(CB,X,)*(l-logit(CB,X,))*&
since the function is non-linear. The
variable's value is determined in the
where Pr(Y=l)  refers to the probability of bankruptcy.
(1)
The probability effects for each of
these variables are also shown in Table 4A. Each variable has been evaluated at the mean
value of the sample. The only variable that stands out as individually producing a strong
change in the probability of bankruptcy when there is a change in its value is  STiNDSEE and12
TABLE 4
ALTMAN, HALDEMAN, NARAYANAN: THE 1977 MODEL
A.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--____________________-_____--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT PROB. EFFECTS T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 0.1289881 0.2040490 0.838
ADPAT 0.0394426 0.001100 0.0433909 0.965
LNAT -0.1053832 -0.003000 -1.0040816 0.315
ADPINT -0.0003453 -8.58E-06 -0.3669110 0.714
CR -0.3871663 -0.011000 -3.1200493 0.002
REAT -0.4536267 -0.013000 -1.7082658 0.088
MKVLICPT -0.4029344 -0.012000 -3.3568218 0.001
STANDSEE 0.4475885 -0.130000 1.1791449 0.238 \
.
Log likelihood -99.357787 X2 = 53.38
Cases with BANK = 1 40 Correct Prediction: 6/40 = 15%































it was insignificant. The significant variables with correct signs would produce 1% changes
in probability. These variables do not have a very strong effect on bankruptcy prediction.
As in the previous model, the conceptualmodelwas constructed primarily for prediction
purposes, but economic meaning for the variables was also instrumental in the process of
variable choice. If the model was being constructed solely for the purpose of prediction,
then the multicollinearity of the variables would not be of concern. Table 4B provides data
on the correlation among the 7 variables in the model. As might be expected there is a
relatively high correlation among the profitability variables and with the profitability
dispersion variable. The size variable, LNAT, is also correlated with the profit variables.
This multicollinearity may be the reason for some of the insignificant t-statistics, since
overall the X2 is highly significant.
The results were as expected for these "old" models. While the 1968 model performed
abysmally, the 1977 model made some improvements, but neither provided a satisfactory
prediction rate nor set of explanatory variables. A partial explanation for these models
inadequate performance lies in the changed structure of the U.S. economy. Fundamentally,
corporations still operate in order to obtain profits and grow, but the strategies they use
and the economic environment in which they implement them have changed since the mid-1970s
and certainly since the 1960s. In the succeeding section another model that emerged out of
the current economic environment provides some information on prevailing forces that are
inducing bankruptcy.
The 1989 Model--DEBT
In the late 1980s a renewed fear of the negative power of debt has emerged with the
growth in junk bond issues and banks' involvement with security underwriting and bridge
capital. The rise in the number of bankruptcies that are large firms and the rise in the
average liabilities of all firms declaring bankruptcy are also important changes that have
emerged on the 1980s economic landscape. Such alterations and innovations in 'corporate14
finance and the concomitant effects on balance sheets would be expected to have an effect
on the models that seek to isolate the determinants of and/or to predict bankruptcy. The
model described in Table 5A reflects the impact of this changing role of debt, as well as
the continued importance of some of the long standing variables that have been associated
with bankruptcy.
The most significant feature of this model is the importance of the debt variable.
Whereas when other models have found a debt ratio to be statistically significant, it was
usually weak in terms of it explanatory or predictive capabilities. As the results in Table
5A show, the short term debt to total assets (DLCAT) variable is not only statistically
significant, it also the strongest explanatory variable as the probability effects indicate.7
The next best explanatory variable is shareholder's equity to total capitalization at book
value (SEQICPT). This variable measures the ownership share of capitalization, and it would
be expected to have the negative relationship to bankruptcy that its sign indicates. The {
remaining variables, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (ROA), the log of
market value of the firm (LNMKVL) and market value to total capitalization (MKVLICPT), have
the correct signs and are statistically significant at a < 0.01, expect for ROA which is
significant at a < 0.05, but as their probability effects show have relatively minor effects
on the probability of bankruptcy. Overall, the model is statistically significant at a <
0.005 with its X2 of 80.74.
Even though this model was not constructed in order to maximize its predictive
capabilities, its within sample predictions out-perform the two previous models as well as
the expected outcome from a random draw. As the results in Table 5A indicate the correct
prediction rate for the entire sample is 93%. As with the previous models this statistic
masks the true predictive capabilities of the model. The correct prediction rate of
bankruptcy is 39% and the rate for solvency is 99%. This bankruptcy prediction rate compares





VARIABLE COEFFICIENT PROB. EFFECTS T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG.
C 0.2998173 0.4149414
ROA -0.0136170 -0.0006000 -2.0686999
LNMKVL -0.3336386 -0.0135000 -2.8115693
DLCAT 5.9125162 0.2401000 3.7472965
SEQICPT -1.8640436 -0.0757000 -2.7874662
MKVLICPT -0.3130367 -0.0127000 -2.6808081
==============_=================___================~==
Log likelihood -89.394777 X2 = 80.742
Cases with BANK = 1 41 Correct Prediction:





























As a corollary to the total sample prediction, the data set was deconstructed into its
three years of data, 1985, 1986 and 1987, and then the model was tested on each year. Since
debt usage has been rising during this time period and concomitantly the share of ownership
capital to total capitalization has been declining (Table l), it might be expected that the
model would become a better predictor over time. Table 6 shows the results of this test.
In 1985 which had the largest number of bankrupt firms the correct prediction rate of
bankruptcy was 35% and for solvency is was 99%; this compares to the bankruptcy population
proportion of 17%. The 1986 bankruptcy prediction rate was 50% and for solvency it was 98%.
This compares to the bankruptcy population proportion of 7%. Finally, for 1987 the
bankruptcy prediction rate was 43% and for solvency it was 99%. The bankruptcy population
proportion in this year was 6%. While the model did perform better in 1986 and 1987 than
it did in 1985, the expected annual increases in performance did not materialize. This may
be due to the inadequate number of bankrupt firms for the 1986 and 1987 sub-samples or to
the changing size of the bankrupt firms over time. In 1985 firms with total assets worth
more than $200 million comprised 15% of the sample; in 1987 they exceeded 40% of the sample.
TABLE 6
PREDICTIONS BASED ON ANNUAL SUB-SAMPLES
YEAR CORRECT PREDICTION CORRECT PREDICTION POPULATION
Pr(Y=l) Pr(Y=O) PROPORTION
==__==============2=======================================~====~=========~====
1985 35% 99% 17%
1986 50% 98% 7%
1987 43% 99% 6%
--------------------------  ---------------.-- ---- ------ -----------------  ------------17
Since this model was explanatory rather than predictive in nature, the correlation among the
variables is meaningful. In Table 5B the correlation coefficients are displayed. While it
may have been expected that the capitalization ratios would be collinear, they were not.
The only clear case of collinearity is between ROA and MKVLICPT. The usual sign of this
multicollinearity, a reduced t-statistic, was not produced.
CONCLUSION
The changing economic environment of the late 1980s has been dominated by the financial
innovations brought about by the growing demand for credit by U.S. corpsrations. When
looking at this phenomena from a very long perspective of 50 to 60 years as some researchers
have done [Taggart, 1985; Ciccolo and Baum, 19851, the rise in leverage on corporations'
balance sheets may not create high anxiety. However, incorporating into that picture the
episode known as the Great Depression should give one pause and a moment for reflection.
It was the Great Depression that followed the prosperous episodes of the 1920s when
households' and the financial sector's use of debt pushed up the private sector's debt-equity
ratio.
When looking at the rise in debt usage from a more localized view as this study has
done, the damage that is possible even without a recession is brought into focus. Debt,
short term debt, has emerged as a very decisive factor in the study of bankruptcy. In
contrast to the previous studies on failure where earnings and profitability dominated as
predictors/determinants, this study has provided support for the view that in this time
period the rise in short term debt usage may lead to increases in bankruptcy. As the data
also very vividly point out, this increase is not isolated to small firms, but increasingly,
large firms are joining the ranks of the failed.18
ENDNOTES
1. One aspect of the debate on the economy's financial position concerns the
historical levels of the corporate, household and government's debt-equity
ratios. Taggart [1985] and Ciccolo and Baum [1985] find the U.S. post-World War
II economy to have had an abnormally low corporate debt ratio when compared to
the 1920s and 1930s.
2. The Graduate School of Business at Harvard University produced a study of
corporate finance that was overseen by W. H. Locke Anderson [1964]. The
principle data source for this study was the Quarterly Financial&port for
Manufacturing Corporations, 1948-1960 that was compiled by the Federal Trade
Commission-Securities Exchange Commission. In this study Locke reports that the
fasting growing component of the manufacturing sector's balance sheet was in
noncurrent liabilities which was primarily comprised of long term debt.' He
gauges the growth of long term debt to be twice that of equity. While indicating
that the use of debt grew during this period, he also pointed out that the
acquisition of physical assets was primarily financed by retained earnings.
Miselman and Shapiro [1964] in an NBER study produce a corporate balance
sheet for the manufacturing sector that is in basic agreement with the Locke
study. Like Locke their results indicate that the growth in long term debt
outpaced equity by a wide margin. Between 1945 and 1958 Miselman and Shapiro
show total long term liabilities to have multiplied by five times, common stock
to have less than doubled and net worth to have grown by 140%. Total short term
liabilities grew by over 150%, so that they grew faster than common stock, but
not as fast as long term liabilities. At the start of the study, 1945,
outstanding long term liabilities had a value that was $5 million less than short
term liabilities, while by the end of the study, 1958, they had surpassed the
value of outstanding short liabilities by more than $2 million.
3. The many early critics of discriminant analysis emphasized not only
violations of the assumptions of classical statistics, but technical problems
in the method that were derivative from the assumption violations [Joy and
Tollefson, 1975 and 1978; Eisenbeis, 1977; and Johnson,l970]. Research into
these problems provided some technical answers [Lachenbruch, 1967; Lachenbruch,
Sneeringer and Revo, 1973; and Marks and Dunn,  19741, however, the dominance of
the school of thought that views econometric techniques as the proper tools for
applied economic research has caused discriminant analysis to be pushed to the
side.
4. Firms that sought bankruptcy protection for non-economic reasons, protection
from contracts enforcement or legal proceeding, were not included in the sample.
Such firms were using the bankruptcy laws as legal protection against employees
and plaintiffs, not owners or creditors.
5. In many of the early discriminant analysis studies the effects of size were
mitigated by using a matched-pair choice-based sample. This can produce
statistical problems, so in this study a random sampling method was employed.19
6. While in regression analysis an F statistic can be used to test the overall
hypothesis that all of the coefficients are equal to zero, in logit this same
test is provided by the X2 distribution which is based on the likelihood ratio
test. The likelihood ratio statistic, c, is determined as follows:
c = -2(logLO - logL1)
where Ll is the value of the likelihood function for the full model and LO is
the maximum value of the likelihood function if all coefficients except the
intercept are 0 [Aldrich and Nelson, 19841.
7. To assure the disbelievers that the debt financial ratio is not masking the
activity of an expenditure variable, various ratios comprised of expenditure
values were tried and found to have the incorrect signs and/or to be
insignificant. \20
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